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Abstract 
Nowadays more and more data of socio-technical systems become available online to 
anyone interested to access it or process it (without data alteration or copyright 
infringement). Generally, these data are stored in relational databases. However, to comply 
with this new paradigm new models of data access and security are necessary. One 
upcoming trend for relational databases is to watermark the database instance, i.e. to 
compute a secret code, which can be either embedded directly into the database or 
registered to a trusted authority. Current watermarking schemes only apply to either a 
particular database relation or index and, generally, distort the data. In this paper, we 
propose a methodology for distortion-free watermarking of both the database schema and 
instance that takes into account the database semantics, its dynamic, and also ensuring 
various security levels within the database. A possible scenario on using this methodology 
on a real-world database is also available. 
 
Keywords: database security; database consistency and integrity; watermarking methodology. 
1. Introduction  
Today more and more data of socio-technical systems becomes available to general public or 
to particular user groups. Users may access it or process it in any way that does not result in 
data alteration or copyright infringement. For example, on the European Union open data portal, 
data collections from several domains are available, ranging from economics, finance, trade, 
industry etc. to politics, social questions, employment and working conditions, education and 
communications, law, international organizations, and so on [9]. Data sets for intrusion 
detection are available on MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s website [21]. Economic and financial data 
sets are available for analysis and research on the website of The World Bank [8]. However, 
collecting and managing data into databases, data warehouses, or scaling them up to big data, 
may raise important economical and strategic concerns for enterprises and public institutions 
as well. In that context, information leaks, thefts (confidentiality, traceability) or data corruption 
(integrity, authenticity), intentional or not, represent a real danger. This is even more critical in 
complex socio-technical systems that includes people, work processes, institutional and cultural 
factors, along with interconnected devices and services that provide for seamless integration of 
digital infrastructure into everyday life. The applications running in such systems often exploit 
physical location and other context information about users and resources to enhance the user 
experience. New types of interaction among users, as well as between the virtual and physical 
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worlds, arise from the need to share resources and collaborate. Moreover, existing policies and 
mechanisms may not provide adequate guarantees to deal with new exposures and 
vulnerabilities introduced by the emerging paradigms, in which it is difficult to separate 
physical security from digital security. For example, information systems involved in pervasive 
computing need to provide high availability (data available from anywhere, anytime, and by 
anybody), and high scalability and elasticity (new resources can be allocated on-demand if 
necessary). However, they raise many questions in terms of security and privacy, especially 
about data confidentiality and integrity. For instance, in case of ubiquitous health monitoring, 
computer assisted rehabilitation, emergency medical response systems, or recording 
confidential medical data, providing for protection of both organizations and end users, while 
fulfilling their goal is a major challenge. Therefore, new approaches of ensuring data and 
information security become necessary, database watermarking being one of them.  
Usually, most of the data in nowadays information systems are relational and, therefore, 
are stored in relational databases. The most common security issues are related to ensuring data 
integrity, tamper detection, and copyright protection. Digital watermarking methods have 
become lately more appealing for data protection and security both in public or private 
databases that can be accessed online.  Watermarking consists in insertion of some security 
message into a host (e.g., an image, an audio signal, or a database) by slightly modifying it 
based on the principle of controlled distortion. Watermarking has significant advantages when 
compared with other security techniques. For example, a common method to detect alteration 
of a database consists in using a digital signature scheme, which provides for security services 
such as message integrity and authentication, nonrepudiation, and protection against message 
tampering. However, this scheme allows to establish whether a database has been modified or 
not, but it does not provide for identifying or recovering the accomplished modifications nor 
for their location or type. Moreover, the integrity verification failure will result in uselessness 
of the entire database. In addition, if some modifications to the database are necessary, a new 
signature has to be computed, while the previous one is discarded. Finally, the generation and 
verification of the signatures is computationally intensive [18]. Applying encryption techniques 
on databases could be another solution for ensuring security of data collections. However, this 
is not feasible because, first, the time of encryption or decryption of large databases is 
prohibitively long, as these operations are computationally intensive as well. Second, the 
majority of users (including even application developers and database administrators) are not 
familiar with cryptographic techniques, and, finally, fully homomorphic encryption is still to 
come [22]. Also, similarly to digital signatures, if some database modifications take place, a 
new encryption of the data is necessary, which affects database performance. Therefore, due to 
the above shortcomings, a more realistic approach consists in using a watermarking technique, 
which generates a secret code based on the data themselves and then either embed it directly 
into the database or register it to a trusted authority. Watermarking has been first introduced for 
securing multimedia objects and extended later to relational databases. Watermarking has 
another important advantage when compared with the above protection mechanisms, because 
it provides also for a posteriori data protection, while those offer only a priori protection and 
once they are bypassed, data are no longer protected. This means that under watermarking 
protection, the data can be manipulated in various ways, while staying protected by means of a 
watermark that provides for protection of owner rights, data integrity, data traceability, etc. [6]. 
However, most of the existing watermarking schemes for relational databases address only 
some particular tables (relations) and/or indexes and, what is worst, alter the data breaking 
this way an important pillar of relational databases, i.e. data consistency. Also, they ignore the 
data semantics when watermarking [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 15, 24, 25, 26, 27]. In our view, for 
increasing the efficacy of  detection and localization of attacks, adequate watermarking needs 
to approach the whole database, without breaking neither data consistency nor integrity that 
are taken for granted in relational databases, this being a totally new approach up to our 
knowledge. The main contribution of this work is twofold: first, it emphasizes the need to 
consider the database as a whole when watermarking and, consequently, to address more 
database elements such as database schema, data dictionary, relationships, integrity constraints, 
etc., while still ensuring the kind of data consistency and integrity expected of relational 
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databases. Secondly, it introduces a general methodology for relational database watermarking 
(which is also applied in a working scenario). The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 
2 includes the basics of watermarking relational databases, a taxonomy of possible attacks, and 
a set of features expected from watermarking schemes, while Section 3 includes the related 
work. Section 4 presents the proposed methodology. Section 5 presents a scenario of applying 
this methodology to a portion of a real-world database. Our main conclusions and future work 
ideas are shown in the final section. 
2. Watermarking Relational Databases  
In this section, basic watermarking schemes for relational databases are shown. A taxonomy of 
possible attacks on such databases and a set of features expected from digital watermarking 
schemes able to resist to such attacks are included as well. 
2.1. Basic Watermarking Schemes for Relational Databases  
In a nutshell, a watermark is a secret code that can be hidden in multimedia objects, files, 
databases, etc. The watermark contains the information necessary for proving ownership or 
tamper detection. Generally, digital watermarking of a database consists of two stages: 
• Watermark Embedding that includes both the watermark generation and its storage, 
either into the database itself or to a trusted authority; 
• Watermark Verification that consists in extraction (computation) of the current 
watermark from the database and checking it against the watermark that is either 
hidden into the database or stored at a trusted authority. 
  In the Watermarking Embedding Stage (Fig. 1), first, a watermark is generated based on 
the original (unmarked) database, using a key (kpr), which is private in most of the techniques 
and which is known only by the database’s owner. Then, the issued watermark is either 
integrated into the database or transmitted, via a secured channel, to a trusted authority. This 
way, a watermarked database is obtained. In the Watermark Verification Stage (Fig. 2), the 
trusted entity extracts the watermark from the Suspicious Database (SDB) and compares it with 
the original watermark information. This trusted entity can be either a legal authority or the 
database owner. The private key is the same in both stages. Even a user who does not know this 
key can still make a request for watermark verification to the trusted authority. 
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Fig. 1. Watermark Embedding Stage. Fig. 2. Watermark Verification Stage. 
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2.2. Taxonomy of Possible Attacks and Features of Watermarking Schemes  
Generally, digital watermarking schemes are designed for integrity verification of database 
relations (fragile watermarking) or copyright protection (robust watermarking). Fragile 
watermarking is used to both detect and localize modifications in database relations. Two main 
attack types exist, which aim at the data sets or the relation watermark [10]. The first one refers 
to alterations of relations through inserting or deleting tuples, changing attribute values, 
reordering tuples, or changing data value ranges. This kind of attack is successful when a 
relation is altered, while the embedded watermark remains unaltered. Second type of attack 
consists in either removal or distortion of the embedded watermark or making it undetectable. 
In [11], the authors show two kinds of attacks (subset and superset) that act simultaneously on 
relations and their watermark. Thus, Mallory deletes or updates a subset of tuples or attributes 
with the intention of losing the watermark (subset attack) or new tuples or attributes are added 
aiming at affecting watermark detection (superset attack). In a brute force attack, the attacker 
tries to guess the private information by checking all the possible values of the key. In a bit 
attack, which is directed to the watermark, the attacker attempts to alter one or more bits in the 
watermarked data aiming to destroy the watermark itself [2]. In a collusion attack, many 
watermarked copies of a relation are compared to each other in order to locate the positions in 
which they are different, i.e. the locations of altered bits. The watermark information must be 
carefully chosen and inserted in the same position in all the copies of a relation to achieve 
resistance to a collusion attack [19]. In a secondary watermark attack an attacker can 
successfully generate his own watermark and embed it in a relation. Using his watermark, he 
can claim the property over the relation [13]. The collusion attack is also identified as a 
comparative attack, while a secondary watermark attack is also known as a pseudo-property 
statement attack [26].  
Based on the variety of possible attacks on watermarked relational databases, a set of 
desirable features of digital watermarking schemes have been identified in the literature [1], 
[7], [10], [11], [24]. Depending on the application, some may be prevalent to others. These 
digital watermarking features are as follows: 
• Robustness measures the watermark resistance to different kinds of attacks; 
• Imperceptibility means accepting slight data distortions during watermarking 
provided those do not affect the database usefulness; 
• Watermarks undetectability is provided by the watermarking techniques; 
• Blindness, i.e. the original database is not needed during watermark verification; 
• Security is ensured by using a private key, which is known only by the owner and by 
some trusted users, and, which has an appropriate length necessary to resist to brute 
force attacks; 
• Publicity - according to Kerckhoffs’ principle, a cryptosystem should remain secure 
in spite of the fact that all the details about the system are public, except for the secret 
key [17]. So, a watermarked database should be secure even if all the details about 
the watermarking schemes are known, with exception of the private information (e.g. 
the private keys) [1]; 
• Incremental watermarking – in case of a database update only the watermark for the 
altered data is re-computed [1]; 
• Localization of alterations is possible using the watermark detection algorithm; 
• Negligibility of false positives and false negatives – a false positive is obtained if a 
watermark is detected for an unwatermarked relation and a false negative if a valid 
watermark is not detected for a watermarked relation that has been attacked; 
• Computational feasibility refers to watermarking schemes (both watermark 
embedding and verification algorithms) that are computationally feasible; 
• One-way watermark generation algorithm refers to the fact that given the 
watermarked database and the algorithm, no private information can be inferred. 
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3. Related Work  
The first digital watermarking scheme for relational databases was proposed by Agrawal and 
Kiernan in 2002 [2]. Their technique ensures that some bit positions of some of the attributes of 
some of the tuples contain specific values. The tuples, the attributes, the bit positions inside an 
attribute, and specific bit values are all algorithmically determined under the control of a private 
key known only to the database owner. This bit pattern constitutes the watermark. Only if one 
has access to the private key can detect the watermark with high probability and it can be 
detected even in a small subset of a watermarked relation as long as the sample contains some 
of the marks. Moreover, detecting the watermark neither requires access to the original database 
nor the watermark. This watermarking technique has some of the necessary characteristics, such 
as robustness, incremental updatability, and blind watermarking, but it only allows 
watermarking numerical attributes (with minor alterations to the data). This scheme also 
ensures copyright protection. In [1], Agrawal, P. J. Haas, and J. Kiernan propose a modification 
to their previous method based on using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom sequence 
generator for the selection of the tuples to be marked. However, using their technique a 
watermark can be applied to any database relation having attributes which are such that changes 
in a few of their values do not affect the applications [2]. 
The fragile watermarking scheme proposed in [10] verifies the integrity of a database and 
detects malicious modifications made to a relation. The watermark inserting algorithm is based 
on operations of grouping and sorting tuples of a relation and on computing values of hash 
functions. In this technique, two kinds of watermarks are used: a tuple watermark and an 
attribute watermark that, together, form a watermarks’ grid that enables the detection of any 
modification. The algorithm works based on the assumption that each attribute’s value allows 
changing of at least two of the least significant bits. In the watermark detection procedure, all 
tuples are divided into groups and each group is verified. The embedded watermarks form a 
watermark grid that provides for tamper detection and localization. This scheme has the 
advantage that allows localization of alterations, but the watermark insertion time is bigger than 
the similar time in the scheme proposed in [2].  
In [14], the authors propose using genetic algorithms for minimization of the distortion-
induced effects. Thus, different attributes are checked against the optimal criteria, rather than 
using less effective attributes for watermark insertion. Given that the distortion caused by 
difference expansion can facilitate the prediction of the watermarked attribute, distortion 
tolerance of different attributes is explored. Moreover, their approach is reversible and hence 
distortion introduced after watermark insertion can be fully restored. To avoid distortions in 
databases, watermarking scheme that use a certification code [25] or a watermark certificate 
[12] have been devised. In [12], the watermark is generated from the most significant bits of 
each attribute of a relation, virtually sorted previously based on the hash values of attributes’ 
names. The watermark verification is done by comparing the watermark with the corresponding 
certified one. Similarly, in [20], the authors propose a fragile watermarking scheme for database 
tables that is based on virtual sorting and partitioning of the data in disjunct groups obtained 
when applying a hash function to both the primary key and the private key. The watermark is 
integrated by reordering the tuples in each independent group. This schema does not introduce 
distortions on the data, but it only works for relations that contain categorical data. A 
watermarking scheme based on hierarchical sorting is introduced in [27]. On level 1, the 
database is divided in rows and columns groups and the watermark information is embedded in 
each group based on an embedding function. At level 2, the groups defined at level 1 are seen 
as rows and columns and each of them is also divided in groups of rows and columns. The 
watermark embedding algorithm does not alter the attributes’ values; it only rearranges the 
entities in the formed groups.  
A relatively new watermarking technique for relational databases that marks both the tables 
and the relevant indexes is introduced in [15]. It is based on the R-tree data structures that store 
the data. The main goal of this technique is to identify unauthorized updates to the R-trees. 
Authorized modifications update also the watermark as needed. The watermark is hidden in the 
set of entries (or minimum bounding rectangles) by re-arranging them inside the R-tree’s nodes 
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in a specific way that corresponds to the value of the watermark W. This re-arrangement is 
performed relatively to an initial secret reference order. The watermark information includes 
all these pieces of information that can be binary images as in [4], indexes, and so on. In [4] the 
watermark information for a tuple is the bit string <1,1,1,0> and more such strings make a 
binary image that correspond to a tuple partition (they use the term partition there for a group 
of tuples). Watermark information is obtained from the hash values computed from both the 
values of some attributes and the primary key of each table.  
A technique that aims at minimizing distortions in the original data set is proposed in [16].  
It generates the watermark bits by taking date-time stamp as an input. Distortion minimization 
is based on enforcing a tolerance level on attributes’ alterations when watermarking a table. 
4. Towards a Methodological Approach of Relational Database Watermarking  
All the schemas presented in the previous section focus on marking some relations, 
independently from each other, and some indexes, some use rearrangements and grouping of 
tuples based on hash values, while some can be used only on numerical value attributes that 
can stand minor alterations or only on categorical data. Also, they are all focused on database 
instance without considering the database schema. In our view, these approaches are only the 
first step toward systematic database watermarking, which will be performed entirely by the 
database management system like transaction management. The core idea of relational 
databases consists in storing both real-world entity types (sets) and their relationships and, 
therefore, database watermarking should be driven by these main elements. Moreover, database 
watermarking needs to take into account both database schema and instance, data semantics 
and dynamics, the metadata in the data dictionary, and database tuning elements. Of course, 
neither watermarking each and every table and each and every index nor watermarking only 
some of them without considering the others can be appropriate. 
4.1. A Methodology for Relational Database Watermarking 
In this section, we introduce our methodology for relational database watermarking (Fig. 3). 
The main premise is that in order to fully comply with the relational data model, no distortions 
of the data are accepted. The word “table” is used generically for actual data tables, but also 
for indexes, tables of the data dictionary, etc. 
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Fig. 3. A methodology for relational database watermarking 
 
Choose the Watermark Technique for the Data Dictionary: the data dictionary is vital for 
relational databases. Any successful attack on it would have catastrophic consequences for the 
entire database. A strong distortion-free watermarking scheme is used to generate the 
watermark, which is then recorded at the database owner or at a trusted authority, or both. 
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Set a Data Security Hierarchy: all data are not created equal with respect to security 
requirements, so a security hierarchy has to be established. On each level, tables with same 
security requirements will be found. This stage is necessary because watermarking a table or 
more can be a very time (and other resources) consuming activity, and therefore, the least 
security-critical tables should be marked not as often and/or not as much as the most critical 
ones. The hierarchy presented in Fig. 4 includes, on the level 0 the most critical parts of the 
data dictionary, on the levels 1 and 2, some other parts of it along with very important data, and 
on level 3 only regular data. The tables are clustered together according to the real-world 
relationships between their stored data (in terms of The Entity Relationship Model). 
 
Fig. 4. Table clusters in the data security hierarchy. 
Choose the Appropriate Watermarking Techniques: our approach is to cascade watermarking 
the tables from a cluster following the relationships between the data. In the watermark 
generation step, watermarkers for tables, tuples, attributes, and also for the entire database will 
be computed based on a hash function that depends on the private keys and/or the primary keys. 
Hash values are used in watermarking because they provide for special security properties: 
preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and collision resistance [23]. In case of 
normal data manipulation, only the watermark information for the database elements involved 
in modifications will be recomputed. Two watermarking schemes are needed: a strong initial 
one that is used for watermarking the initial version of a database and a routine one that 
watermarks database elements periodically based on their security level. In the strong 
watermarking scheme all the relations are considered security-critical and the watermarking is 
performed based on all the data in tables. Of course, this is time and computing power 
consuming, but it is worthwhile doing that from time to time. In the routine watermarking 
scheme, the marking is made using a different scheme and based on the security level of each 
table. For example, for tables with high security needs (found on the top levels of the hierarchy) 
the watermarking scheme is based on all the data in the tables, while for ordinary ones the 
watermarking can be based only on some of their data. The tables are watermarked in cascade 
based on the relationships between the data and on dynamic of data changes. For instance, in 
case of an one-to-one(many) relationship between the relations Ri and Rj, when a tuple in the 
relation Ri is selected to be marked, the corresponding tuple(s) in the relation Rj will be selected 
for marking as well, provided that it has not been marked already. This way, the tuple 
watermarks are generated. The selection of the attributes to be marked is based on their use 
frequency, for example, the unique number that identifies a company is used for fiscal issues 
far more often than any other numerical values. A relation’s watermark depends on both the 
tuples’ watermarks and the attributes’ watermarks. A database watermark is an aggregation 
function of the relations’ watermarks. As alterations of the actual data are not accepted in our 
methodology, in this stage only distortion-free schemes may be used. Such schemes generally 
use a secret virtual partitioning of tuples in groups based on the secret key, and then generate 
each group’s watermark and the whole table’s watermark, and, finally, store the watermark 
information [3,4,5].  
Schedule Watermarking Operations: timestamps are used for scheduling watermarking 
operations (embedding or verifying). They will be included in the database security procedures 
and will depend on the content and functionality of a database, on the importance of the stored 
data, on the categories of users etc. 
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Private keys’ generation: the initial private key is chosen so that the desired security level 
is obtained, e.g. it has to be long enough to resist to brute-force attacks. Private keys are 
generated using various methods for cryptographically secure random number generation 
having as a seed the initial private key. One or more private keys may be used according to the 
watermarking scheme. During the database lifecycle many private keys will be used. 
Initial and Routine Database Watermark Embedding: a database is watermarked first after 
its initialization and afterwards periodically, by its database administrators, in accordance with 
the security policies and procedures. Therefore, this methodology needs to be customized for 
each database to be watermarked. For instance, the time interval between successive routine 
watermarking is set based on the database semantics and dynamic and also on the needed 
security level. Thus, when the number of updated records in database tables reaches a database 
specific threshold, the routine watermarking is performed (incrementally whenever possible). 
This approach can provide for increased security in case of (portions of) databases with critical 
security needs, while some others may not be watermarked quite as often. Watermarks’ logging 
is necessary for easy monitoring of security breaches and attacks.  
Request Watermark Verification: watermark detection is performed at various levels of the 
database. First, the database watermark is computed and checked and, in case of a mismatch, 
the watermarks of relations are verified. When a relation watermark mismatches, the tuple and 
attribute watermarks are checked as well. This approach provide for localization of 
unauthorized alteration within the database. Watermark detection is performed either 
periodically, in accordance with the security policies and procedures or in case of an attack 
suspicion. The recovery to a consistent state relies on identifying the tuples and columns altered 
by the attack and recovering them using both the available backups and specific techniques 
depending on the watermarking schemes used.  
Resolution Watermark Mismatch: in case of a watermark detection mismatch, a specific 
procedure is activated that generates an alert message and/or block the access to the entire 
database or only to some portion of it (the affected part), and then analyze the attack (its source, 
its effects, if it still produces effects etc.). Further on, corrections to the database are applied to 
get the database in the last consistent state before the attack. 
4.2. Additional Features for Database Watermarking Schemes  
In addition to the database watermarking features presented in Section 2.2, to make possible to 
use our methodology some extra features are required, such as extended robustness with respect 
to ensuring data integrity, preserving relation schemes and data constraints, and so on; data 
semantics-driven, i.e. the watermarking process has to be driven by the semantics of the data 
and not by some particular data in some relation instances; distortion-free because allowing 
distortions may violate the data consistency; private key strength that requires choosing private 
keys that are able to resist to brute force attacks; time effectiveness with respect to both 
watermark generation and detection; watermark logging for scrutinizing of security breaches 
and attacks and easily detecting the malicious users; adaptive watermarking based on the 
database semantics and dynamic and also on the needed security level. 
The proposed methodology provides for watermarking both database schema and instance, 
taking into account both data semantics and dynamics, as well as its importance based on a data 
security hierarchy, enforcing data consistency in accordance with the relational data model, 
saving computational power and other resources because only the altered records that represent 
related data across database tables are cascade watermarked, while still ensuring the security 
requirements, narrowing down quickly to the groups and records affected by unauthorized 
database alterations, using in both public and private databases, extra security for databases, as 
a whole, and, consequently, it can be a first step towards the systematic database watermarking, 
the main goal being to have the database management system performing the watermarking 
similarly to transaction management. Relying on distortion-free schemes is a significant 
shortcoming for the time being, as the scarcity of such schemes that are easy to implement is a 
fact. 
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5. A Scenario of Using the Methodology 
Our goal here is to see how this methodology works on a portion of a real database (called 
wqdb) that is a part of a quote management information system (both for products and services). 
The database has 30 tables, each of them holding hundreds of tuples. As this is a legacy database 
that has not been normalized yet, the relations are in various normal forms. The relations Quotes 
and Items_quotes contain data about the product quotes, while the relations Quotes_services 
and Items_ quotes_services include data about the service quotes. The Products and Services 
tables contain, respectively, information about the available products and services. The 
Customers table contains data about the clients. The main relation schemas are as follows (the 
primary keys are underlined; some fields are left out): 
Customers (customer_code, customer_name, uic, no_reg_commerce, country, city, street, 
no, phone, fax, email, contact_person, bank, account). The fields that are not self-explanatory 
mean, respectively: uic (company unique identification code), no_reg_commerce (trade register 
identifier); Products (catalogue_code, short_name, description, warranty_period); Quotes 
(no_quote, version, state, date_quote, id_user, customer_code, delivery_term, valid, standard, 
total_value, global_discount, quote_value, advance). The fields that are not self-explanatory 
mean, respectively: state (i.e. sent to client, under processing, etc.), id_user (the employee who 
made the quote), valid (when true, an order based on the quote was placed), standard 
(quality_standard), quote_value (the quote value after applying the discount to the total value); 
Services (service_code, service_name, wqdb_lst_price); Quotes_services (no_quote, ver, area, 
state, date_quote, id_user, customer_code, delivery_tem, valid, standard, total_value, 
global_discount, quote_value, advance) – this contains data about the quotes that correspond to 
the services provided by the company, the meaning of the fields being similar to the above ones; 
Items_quotes (no_quote, ver, no_item, catalogue_code, name_for_quote, purchase_price, 
supplyer_discount, supplyer_list_price, wqdb_discount, wqdb_list_price, quote_discount, 
quote_price, quantity, value) – this corresponds to an entry to the quotes’ catalogue for 
products, the meanings of the non self-explanatory fields being as follows: no_item (entry 
index), name_for_quote (the name of the product), wqdb_discount (the minimum discount for 
that product), quote_discount (the actual discount, as a percent), quote_price (as 
wqdb_list_price - wqdb_list_price*quote_discount), and value (as quantity*quote_price); 
Items_quotes_ services (no_quote, ver, no_item, service_code, value_service – this 
corresponds to an entry to the quotes’ service catalogue. 
According to our methodology, after initializing a database, a strong cascade fragile 
watermarking is applied to all the data (so, initially, everything is watermarked). Periodically, 
a routine watermarking scheme is applied, as follows. First step is to choose a watermarking 
scheme for the data dictionary. Taking into account the data dictionary importance, that scheme 
uses all its rows and columns. We used a part of the data dictionary with 116 records and 23 
columns and two kinds of watermarks, one for tuples and one for attributes, which, together, 
form a watermarks’ grid (as in [6]). A private key has been generated using a cryptographically 
secure pseudo-random number generator. Usually, large dimension keys (more than 128 bits) 
are used because they provide for a reasonable level of security. In our case, the generated key 
was (3832765987080). However, several private keys can be used and the same key may be 
used throughout the whole procedure or not. Further on, for each pair (tuple, column) of the 
dictionary a hash value is computed, based on the tuple data, the column data, and the selected 
private key. Basically, the watermark information associated with the data dictionary consists 
of two sequences of hash values, one for tuples and one for columns that will be stored at a 
trusted authority. In the verification stage, the watermark information is extracted from the 
suspicious data dictionary and verified against the stored watermark information. If any 
difference exists then the database has been altered and, therefore, the procedures for watermark 
mismatch resolution are launched. We have chosen this fragile watermarking technique because 
it allows locating the modification in case of an unauthorized alteration. 
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Set a Data Security Hierarchy: this hierarchy takes into account both the importance of the 
data stored in the database tables and the operating mode on the database (some data may be 
accessed from within the organization, some not, various categories of users etc.) – Fig. 5. 
 Choose the Appropriate Watermarking Techniques: further on, a cascade watermarking 
only on the tables Quotes, Customers, and Item_quotes is illustrated. The connectivity of the 
relationships between Customers and Quotes, and, respectively, Quotes and Item-quotes, is 
one-to-many. We started the watermarking with the table Quotes, based on the fact that in the 
real world, many customers may exist without having associated quotes yet. Suppose that the 
size of these three tables is as follows: Quotes has 1600 records, Items_quotes has 3400 records, 
and Customers has 500 records. The cascade watermark embedding works this way: when a 
tuple of Quotes is selected to be marked, the corresponding tuples from Items_quotes and 
Customers will be marked as well, following the relationship between the data.  
Private keys’ generation: this stage is important in our methodology because choosing keys 
cryptographically unsecure can lead to database vulnerability to brute force attack. To show 
how our methodology works, two different keys have been used: one for the cascade 
watermarking of the database and one for watermarking the data dictionary. Prime numbers are 
fundamental for key generators and, therefore, we used the prime number 991 for 
exemplification (to ensure real protection, a much larger number would be necessary). Using it 
as a seed, we generated an integer g that is the number of clusters to be formed. For efficiency 
reasons, this number need to be much smaller than the minimum between the number of tuples 
of Quotes and Customers The g number (obtained using the C# Random class) was 79, which 
is conveniently smaller than 500 (the minimum). Next, we computed a hash value based on the 
concatenation between the values of the primary key and the seed. Based on this hash value, 
the group to which each tuple belongs is determined. Cascading further, the same number of 
groups is taken into account and the tuples of Items_quotes are grouped following the 
relationship between the data in Quotes and the data in Items_quotes. E.g., for the record in 
Quotes identified by no_quote=975 and ver=3, we computed a hash value (9753991) mod 79 
and the obtained result, 47 is the group number in which this record will belong. Moreover, all 
the records in Items_quotes for which no_quote=975 and ver=3 will belong in group 47 of the 
table Items_quotes. The Customers’ clusters are constituted similarly, based on the equality 
between the values of customer_code in Quotes with custo-mer_code in Customers. For the 
record with no_quote=975 and ver=3, the customer_code is 131. As a result, the record of 
Customers identified by customer_code=131 belongs to group 47. In fact, for each table, all the 
tuples have been partitioned this way (Fig. 6). The selection of the attributes that will contribute 
to the hash values is made based on the dependencies between the data (that show data 
semantics) and, in some cases, all of them may be necessary.  
During the stage of Request Watermark Verification in case of tamper detection, first the 
altered group is identified based on group watermark information, and then the altered tuple 
based on tuple watermark information. During the stage of Resolution Watermark Mismatch 
procedures to get the database into a consistent state are triggered, along with other specific 
ones such as establishing the attacker’s identity, identifying the attack type, updating the 
watermarking schemes and procedures, and, of course, getting the whole database updated. 
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6. Conclusion and Future Work 
Expansion of the digital world based on more and more sophisticated pervasive systems both 
outwards, to the environment we live in, and inwards, to our inner self, opens up new challenges 
for ensuring both security and safety within this complex and pervasive world. Current trends 
in development of information systems consist in linking users and databases within socio-
technical systems, and in increasing the importance of organizational factors. However, cyber 
attacks have increased as well and they are more and more ingenious every day. The attackers 
can be outsiders or insiders. Sometimes, trusted persons can steal or modify data in an 
indistinctive way. For example, a bank employee can transfer periodically a infinitesimal 
amount of money from client accounts to a secret account he or she has access to; clients may 
not realize that is happening, the amount being really insignificant, but in time, the damage may 
be important. Copyright protection is also a challenge within the emerging open world. 
Watermarking has been used successfully mainly for files that contain images, multimedia, or 
documents. Recently, significant progress has taken place also in case of data stored in tables. 
A challenge still remains with respect to relational databases. In more and more domains, such 
as research, education, health etc., databases are made public and anyone can use their content. 
Therefore, they are more and more vulnerable. But also private databases that are networked 
and, therefore easily accessible online by various users, including mischievous ones, are equally 
vulnerable. Many of the database security issues can be approached by using database 
watermarking in conjunction with other security techniques (data encryption, digital signatures, 
digital certificates, access control, identity control, etc.).  
The main contribution of this paper is dual and consists in designing from scratch a 
methodology for relational database watermarking and put it to work on a portion of a real 
database. The main lesson learned is that a database can be watermarked as a whole, while still 
ensuring the kind of data consistency and integrity expected of relational databases. 
Furthermore, whenever possible, the watermarking scheme for a relational database should be 
devised during the database design stage. We are currently working to integrate this 
methodology as a service offered by the database management system itself. 
Nevertheless, using such a methodology is only a first step towards a systematic approach 
of relational database watermarking. The days when the watermarking procedures will be 
provided by the database management system itself, in a similar way with transaction control, 
are still to come. Future work is possible in the meantime with regard to performing some 
experiments with various (types of) databases and database management systems, evaluating 
performance and overheads, clarifying some methodological aspects, identifying the most 
appropriate watermarking schemes with respect to various database categories, its scalability, 
and, finally, to documenting the methodology better to facilitate experimenting with it.   
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